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 Abstract 
 
This paper analyses bank relative riskiness by testing the sensitivity of Asia-
Pacific banks to overall market risk, global credit risk shocks, interest rate 
risk shocks and maturity risk shocks. The banks’ risk profiles are categorised 
according to their capitalisation levels and functional degree of 
diversification. Our results indicate that highly capitalised banks yield higher 
average stock returns whilst functionally diversified banks have less volatile 
returns. Generally, banks that adopt capital adequacy guidelines and hold 
higher capital levels have greater protection from these risks. Functionally 
diversified banks are also more strongly positioned against system-wide 
shocks to the banking sector.  
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 1.  Introduction 
 
The last 100 years have seen banks coping with problems relating to asymmetric 
information during and following episodes of shocks to the banking system. These shocks 
lead to a deterioration of the overall economic environment and more frequently, increased 
volatility levels in financial markets. During economic upswings, lending volumes tend to rise 
but the banks’ natural response during downswings would be to tighten lending practices and 
sometimes invoke credit rationing. Nonetheless, existing loans and open trading positions 
threaten the value of banks’ as firms.  
 
Bank assets are relatively opaque to the general public as they cannot be seen directly. If 
markets are efficient, then one way to observe the impact of exogenous economic events on 
the financial healthiness of banks is to examine the stock market’s evaluation of bank equity. 
As financial intermediaries, banks are inherently exposed to credit, interest rate, market, 
liquidity, foreign exchange, and country risks. Some risks are likely to have more significant 
effects on some banks than others, and they are sometimes inter-related.  
 
Adverse shifts in financial market conditions can worsen the creditworthiness of banks’ 
borrowers. To manage their exposure against some of the associated risks, banks can hedge 
risky positions by using “off-balance sheet” activities. Other risk management methods 
include functional diversification of income sources and the holding of higher capital levels to 
back up riskier loans. Since banks now operate globally, not only are they concerned with 
domestic economic conditions, but shocks to the global financial system affect them too.  
 
The widely accepted risk-based capital adequacy ratio (RBC) standard of 8% proposed 
by the Bank of International Settlements has now been adopted by banking systems in both 
developed and emerging economies as a benchmark in the formulation of capital regulation 
policies. However, banks can signal their financial strength and maintain confidence of their 
own creditworthiness by choosing to hold higher capital levels. Capital “cushioning” can 
protect against potential contingent losses, thereby lowering the risk of bank failure and can 
implicitly lead to lower funding costs. This in turn, implies that banks with a relatively higher 
level of capitalisation should be less sensitive to adverse changes in market and credit 
conditions and thereby less sensitive to credit risk (Landschoot and Vander Vennet, 2001). 
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In their efforts to maintain competitiveness in an increasingly sophisticated and global 
financial market system, a popular trend for banks is to adopt functional diversification, 
integrating non-traditional financial services such as commercial banking, insurance, 
investments and superannuation into their business model. Functional diversification reduces 
the dependence on interest income and hence, increases the proportion of non-interest income. 
Dewenter and Hess (1998) provide evidence that universal banks tend to be less risky than 
their specialised counterparts. Therefore, this implies that functionally diversified banks 
should be less sensitive towards adverse changes to regional and international credit and 
interest rate risk compared to specialised banks.   
 
This paper assesses the sensitivity of Asia-Pacific banks grouped under different risk 
profiles according to their degrees of capitalisation and functional diversification against 
changes to global credit risk, and to regional market, interest rate and maturity risks.1 In 
comparison with previous studies, not all of the countries in our sample adopted the BIS 
capital adequacy standard of 8%. We explore the desirability for banks in the Asia-Pacific 
region to adopt stricter capital adequacy rules and to become more functionally diversified. 
We proceed to assess their risk premiums, which will indicate the propensity of each profile 
group to hedge against each risk component. A statistical strength of our study is the 
avoidance of  the errors-in-the-variables problem, achieved by forming equally weighted and 
value weighted portfolios as well as using the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) as a 
means of estimation of our four-factor APT model.  
 
We draw three main lessons drawn from the study: first, less diversified banks rely 
heavily on interest income and so must aim to maintain high capital levels to protect against 
deterioration of their borrowers’ creditworthiness. Second, diversified banks should not be 
misled to believe that diversification allows for riskier lending practices. Finally, in order for 
capital adequacy ratios to be an effective strengthening tool and bulwark against risks, 
accounting and classification standards in relation to what constitutes equity levels should be 
consistent with those of developed economies and international standards so as to ensure 
consistency in international comparisons.  
 
The organisation of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 we review the literature relating 
to the importance of financial and banking system stability, developments and possible 
implications of bank regulation and market disciplinary forces and commonly applied 
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indicators of bank fragility. Section 3 sets out our proposed four-factor model and our 
research hypotheses. We discuss our general procedure, data selection and analysis in Section 
4. Our findings follow in Section 5, where we present our empirical results and derive some 
general conclusions about the characteristics of each risk profile group and we make some 
suggestions about future risk management developments for Asia-Pacific banks. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
 
Bank crises can occur in both developed and emerging economies. Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999) and Rossi (1999) established a causal relationship between banking and 
currency crises and found that during recessions, banks typically suffer substantial losses, 
sometimes even to the extent of requiring costly government bailouts. Hoggarth, Reis and 
Saporta (2002) provide an extensive review of the fiscal and output losses incurred by bank 
crises for both developed and emerging economies. Over the period of 1992 – 2002, 24 major 
crises studied indicated that losses averaged from 15 – 20% of GDP and the restoration costs 
for distressed banks were much larger for emerging economies that for those with higher 
degrees of banking intermediation. They also note that currency crises and large recessions 
that worsen economic conditions can ultimately translate into banking crises for these 
emerging economies.  
 
Thus, regulation of the banking systems is crucial for both financial systems and the 
smooth operation of economies. While it is widely known that capital adequacy ratios have 
had significant impact on banks’ risk taking behaviour, studies on this issue have form two 
main streams. The first school of thought argues that the regulation causes banks to withstand 
negative shocks. The other stream suggests that regulation causes banks to change their 
attitudes towards risk taking and instead could have a variety of effects, including causing 
banks to prefer less risky loans so as to reduce their capital held, thus reducing banks’ overall 
profitability (Chiuri, Ferri and Majnoni, 2002). Nevertheless, this literature on the impact of 
RBC for bank’s asset risk is quite an extensive and sometimes a contradictory one. For 
example Furlong and Keeley (1989) show that capital requirements reduce risk-taking 
incentives in the case of value-maximising banks. Whilst Flannery (1989) suggests that there 
actually might be an inducement towards higher risk-taking. Koen and Santomero (1980) and 
Rochet (1992) demonstrate in a mean variance framework that RBC combined with 
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inappropriate risk weights may increase bank riskiness. Some, such as Boot and Greenbaum 
(1993) have argued that RBC requirements reduce monitoring incentives and this then serves 
to reduce the quality of bank portfolios. Gehrig (1995) suggests that RBC affect the nature of 
strategic competition between banks. Finally, Blum (1999) also argues that in a dynamic 
framework RBC may increase a bank’s riskiness. 
 
However, Saunders (2002) comments that the introduction of capital adequacy 
standards may cause banks to prefer lending to the public sector rather than the private sector, 
since capital requirements would be lower. In the case of emerging economies with under-
developed capital markets, this would lead to a credit shortage for the private sector that 
depends heavily on bank credit.2 
 
A further issue concerns the fact that RBC may be open to manipulation. Jones (2000) 
suggests that securitisation and other financial innovations have provided opportunities for 
banks to substantially reduce their RBC based measures of risk. This is typically matched by 
little reduction in actual economic risks. He terms this process ‘regulatory capital arbitrage’. 
This leads to the possibility that reported RBC ratios could mask deterioration in the true 
financial conditions of banks. Furthermore, there may be associated competitive inequities in 
that regulatory capital arbitrage may not be equally available to all banks and may be related 
to differences in economies of scale and scope, or to differences in accounting, supervisory 
and legal regimes. 
 
This is related to the issue that evidence on the usefulness of capital adequacy ratios 
might not equally apply to emerging markets. Sach, Tornell and Velasco (1996) point out that 
capital adequacy and liquidity standards typically emphasised in developed economies may 
not be sufficient to regulate the more volatile emerging markets. Similarly, Rojas-Suarez 
(2001) also found that capital standards have little supervisory usefulness in emerging 
markets due to the structure of their financial sectors in comparison to developed economies.  
 
Recent trends focus on the issue of market discipline as a supplementary tool to 
traditional supervisory standards. Crockett (2002) points out that market forces are powerful 
disciplinary tools because of the speed and efficiency in which information is reflected in 
prices. Good risk taking behaviour will be rewarded with share price increases. Sironi (2002) 
also states two reasons for the need for market discipline. First, because banks tend to operate 
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globally, their domestic regulator has limited control on their risk taking behaviour. Secondly, 
with the implementation of capital adequacy standards, banks are now applying their own 
market risk models to determine capital levels provided that they conform to general 
guidelines of the BIS, and therefore there is much room for independent judgement.3 
 
Studies by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Demirguç-Kunt and Detragiache (2000) 
focus on the macroeconomic factors that help predict banking and currency crises. However, 
few studies have tried to analyse the origins of the East Asian crisis using individual bank 
data. Bongini, Claessens and Ferri (2001) addressed this issue by using traditional CAMEL-
type indicators to help predict bank distress and failure in the East Asian crisis countries.4 
Bongini, Laeven and Majnoni (2002) studied banks active before and during the Asian 
currency crises and found that stock prices and credit ratings did not outperform balance sheet 
information as indicators of fragility and that stock market information responded much faster 
to changing financial conditions compared to credit ratings. Konishi and Yasuda (2004) 
analyse risk taking by Japanese banks and conclude that the adoption of RBC has served to 
reduce risk-taking by Japanese banks. 
 
Recent studies have argued that public information about the impact of economic events 
relevant to the financial health of banks should be reflected in stock market valuation. The 
evidence suggests that the market is able to efficiently react to information concerning 
individual banks and to changes in the regulatory environment. This suggests that markets 
have the ability to assess the quality of banks’ assets. Since stock price information can 
provide valuable information about the soundness of banks and is relatively easy to obtain, 
using this type of information could be beneficial for both investors and prudential regulators 
(Berger, Davies and Flannery, 2000, De Young; Flannery, Lang and Sorescu, 2001; Bongini 
et al., 2002). 
 
3.  Testing Hypotheses and methodology 
 
We used a four-factor APT model to test the sensitivity of bank returns to overall 
market risk (M), credit risk shocks (CR), interest rate risk shocks (IR) and maturity risk shocks 
(MR). If markets are efficient, then banks returns should only react to unanticipated 
components of the risk factors. Related studies that have examined the effects of market, 
credit and maturity risks include Dewenter and Hess (1988), Demsetz and Strahan (1998) and 
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Landschoot and Vander Vennet (2001). Other studies such as those by Sweeney and Warga 
(1986), Yourougou (1990), Choi, Elyasiani and Kopecky (1992) and Allen and Jagtiani 
(1996) have looked at the effects of market and interest rate risks on bank returns.  
 
Assuming bank returns ( ) follow a factor model of the form specified by Ross (1976) 
and Shanken (1982)
i
tR
5: 
 
i
ttMRtIRtCRtM
i
t UMRUIRUCRUMR εββββα +++++=  (1) 
 
where Mttt MUM µ−= , CRttt CRUCR µ−= , IRttt IRUIR µ−= and MRttt MRUMR µ−=  are 
the unexpected parts of the market, credit, interest rate and maturity risk factors at time t. Mβ , 
CRβ , IRβ  and MRβ are the loadings on the state variables, α  is a constant term and is the 
idiosyncratic error term. 
i
tε
 
The second part of our analysis examines the factor betas in (1) to see if they translate into 
economically meaningful risk premiums. Expanding from the APT framework, the second 
pass regression yields the associated risk premiums Mλ , CRλ , IRλ and MRλ (Shanken, 1982). 
We augment equation (1) into the representation: 
 
i
tMRttMRIRttIRCRttCRMttM
i
t MRIRCRMR εµβµβµβµβα +−+−+−+−+= ][][][][  
 (2) 
Under the condition of no-arbitrage, (2) implies that: 
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If there is a riskless asset with a return of RFµ , then 0=Fβ and 0λµ =RF . If there is no 
riskless asset, then λ0 would be the expected rate of return on a zero-beta portfolio.  
 
By substituting equation (2) into (3), the empirical model for the APT may be expressed 
as: 
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Since the factors are exogenously specified as the innovations of the factors, equation (4) 
includes the risk shocks, UM, UCR, UIR and UMR. Finally, denoting δM = λM – µM,  
δCR = λCR – µCR, δIR = λIR – µIR and δMR = λMR – µMR, and replacing each factor by its 
innovation, (4) can be specified as: 
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Following the approaches of Fama and MacBeth (1973) and Chen, Roll and Ross 
(1986), estimating equation (1) could enable the derivation of the factor betas for each 
individual bank and these beta estimates from the first pass regression could be applied as 
independent variables in the second pass regression of (3) to obtain estimates for the factor 
risk premiums. However, equation (3) is specified in terms of true betas, whereas the first 
pass regression only yields estimates for the betas. Fama and MacBeth (1973) warn that this 
two step approach results in an errors-in-variables problem, implying that the estimates are 
inconsistent and biased.  
 
To control for this problem, Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) and Banz (1981) suggest 
grouping returns into equally weighted and value weighted portfolios to reduce the noise of 
individual returns. Our study also constructs equally weighted and value weighted portfolios 
for each risk group category. We construct equally weighted portfolios since systematic risk 
should affect all banks, regardless of size. However, an alternative argument is that large 
banks are those that matter when financial system stability is concerned and therefore, value 
weighted portfolios must be used.  
 
A better approach to avoid the problem of errors-in-variables is to simultaneously 
estimate the betas and risk premiums for the factors using the GMM (Hansen, 1982). This 
technique allows us to use time series together with cross sectional information and constrains 
the λ’s and µ’s of each factor to be identical across individual banks and for portfolios of 
banks in each risk group. GMM also allows for estimation despite the presence of serial 
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correlation and heteroskedasticity in the factors. It chooses the factor betas that minimises the 
quadratic form in the sample moment conditions: 
 
GMMβˆ = βminarg m (β)´ W m (β) (6) 
β is a K-vector of parameters, m (β) is an L-vector of orthogonality conditions, and W is an 
T×T positive definite weighting matrix. An important contribution by Hansen (1982) is to 
point out that setting W = S-1, where S-1 is the inverse of an asymptotic covariance matrix, 
then W is optimal in the sense that it yields the estimated parameters  with the smallest 
asymptotic variance. More weight is attached to the moment conditions that have smaller 
variances. 
βˆ
 
The main hypotheses in our study, based on the risk factors faced by banks inherent in 
the process of financial intermediation are: 
• Banks are exposed to credit risk due to the creditworthiness of their borrowers. Hence, it 
is expected that their stock returns exhibit sensitivity to credit risk shocks ( ) and 
the risk premium should be positive (λ
0<iCRβ
CR > 0). The risk premium for unanticipated 
shocks to credit spread should be positive because banks would want to hedge against 
unanticipated increases in the aggregate risk premium accompanying an increase in 
uncertainty (Chen, Roll and Ross, 1986). 
• Functionally diversified banks should be less sensitive to credit risk shocks than 
specialised banks, because they have lesser reliance on loans as a source of income 
( ). Universal banking carries diversification benefits applied similarly to 
portfolio theory concepts (Dewenter and Hess, 1988). 
NFD
CR
FD
CR ββ <
• Highly capitalised banks should be less sensitive to credit risk shocks than those with 
lower equity to asset ratios ( ), because they can use their equity as working 
capital to cover themselves against losses (Berger, 1995). 
PC
CR
HC
CR ββ <
• The sensitivity of banks with respect to credit risk differs within subgroups. Hence, the 
stock market should be able to assess the cross-sectional differences of banks’ credit 
risk exposure (Fama and French, 1993). 
• Shocks to the short-term interest rate (UIR) and the maturity spread (UMR) affect 
banks’ interest income. While it can be expected that ( ), the associated risk 0<iIRβ
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premium (λIR >0) should also be positive because banks would want to limit their 
potential downside risk of earnings. Depending on the ratio of long to short-term assets, 
changes to the maturity spread can affect bank returns positively or negatively 
( ), and so the propensity for banks to hedge this imbalance would also be of 
opposite sign. 
0≠iMRβ
 
4.  The estimation sample and testing strategy 
 
We assessed the sensitivity of banks categorised under four different risk profiles in 
Australia, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, 
Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand against changes to global credit risk, regional market, 
interest rate and maturity risks.6 
 
Monthly stock returns for our sample of 162 banks from the period of the 1st January 
1992 to 1st January 2002 were used. A broad market proxy (M) was constructed using a 
regional index comprising the major stock exchanges of each country included in the sample, 
value-weighted by market capitalisation. 
 
The credit spread (CR) used in the estimations is the difference between a portfolio of 
corporate bond yields and government bonds. The credit spread has been used in various 
studies such as Chen et al. (1986) as a proxy for credit risk. This global portfolio comprises 
yields for Australia, Canada, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K. and U.S. The composite 
measure of world credit risk is constructed as the GDP-weighted average of spreads for those 
countries. A credit spread measure comprising a regional portfolio for the 11 sample countries 
could not be used because consistent data for each country dating back to 1992 could not be 
obtained from Datastream. 
 
The interest rate factor (IR) is a constructed portfolio of the GDP-weighted average 3-
month indicator rate for Australia, Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore. Since the corresponding 
3-month rates for the other countries in the sample was unavailable from Datastream, this 
interest rate factor should serve as a good proxy for interest rate movements for the East 
Asian region. 
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The maturity spread (MR) is the difference between a 10-year government bond yield 
and the 3-month interest rate for Australia, Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore.  This regional 
portfolio was constructed as the GDP-weighted average of spreads for those countries. Again, 
the relevant data for this measure could not be obtained from Datastream for the rest of the 
countries in the sample study due to inconsistent start dates and definitions.  
 
Accounting data for each bank in the sample was also collected. Information on Total 
Income, Total Assets, Net Interest Income and Total Income was obtained from Datastream. 
From this, Non-Interest Income was calculated by taking the difference between Total Income 
and Net Interest Income. The banks were grouped into one of four risk profile groups, 
namely: 
• Highly Capitalised/ Functionally Diversified (HCFD) 
• Highly Capitalised/ Not Functionally Diversified (HCNFD) 
• Poorly Capitalised/ Functionally Diversified (PCFD) 
• Poorly Capitalised/ Not Functionally Diversified (PCNFD) 
 
Highly Capitalised (HC) banks are those that have a total equity to assets ratio of more 
than 6%, while Poorly Capitalised (PC) banks are those with ratios less than 6%. Australia 
conforms to the 8% capital adequacy guideline where it is stipulated that 4% must be made up 
of Tier 1 Core Capital (Saunders & Lange, 2000, p. 322). Tier 1 capital is closely linked to a 
bank’s book value of equity reflecting the concept of the core capital contribution of a bank’s 
owners. It includes the book value of ordinary shares, an amount of irredeemable preference 
shares and minority equity interests held by the bank in subsidiaries. Therefore, the measure 
of total equity reported for those banks should capture Tier 1 capital. The benchmark of 6% 
was chosen because it is a fair margin above the 4% minimum sufficient to be considered 
high capitalisation.  
 
For a bank to be categorised as Functionally Diversified (FD), the ratio of non-interest 
income to total income has to be greater than 15% as applied by Vander Vennet and 
Landschoot (2001). Banks whose proportion of non-interest income to total income was less 
than 15% are considered Not Functionally Diversified (NFD) as they have heavier reliance on 
the interest margin between their assets and liabilities for profitability. 
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The grouping of the total 162 banks in the sample can be summarised as follows: 
 
[Insert table 1 here] 
 
There are a total of 56 banks classified as HCFD, while 98 banks are PCFD. This is because 
almost half of the sample banks taken were Japanese banks, and they have been found to 
enjoy a funding cost advantage by operating with significantly lower capital-to-assets ratio 
compared to other G10 countries (Wagster, 1996). Before the Basel Capital Accord was 
imposed, the average capital-to-assets ratio was 2.11% and these low levels have been 
persistent even in recent years. The low capital levels of these banks may bias our tests and so 
a new risk profile group PCFD2 was included in the analysis, which excludes all Japanese 
banks.7 
 
The factors M, CR, IR and MR were tested for unit roots and differenced accordingly 
into stationary processes. Then, the unanticipated components of the factors were derived 
using a VAR framework and using GMM, we regressed the returns of each bank in the 
portfolios against the derived unanticipated factors of UM, UCR, UIR and UMR. We applied 
the JT test for model fit (Hansen, 1982) to ensure that the model is accurately specified. Then, 
the β estimates were applied as inputs into the second pass regression to yield the λ’s.  
 
5.  Empirical results 
 
We conducted the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test for unit roots on M, CR, IR and 
MR up to a lag order of 5. We compared the test statistics for the highest AIC and SBC values 
against a 5% critical value. We found that while M is a stationary process and can be applied 
as UM into the estimation model, CR, IR and MR were non-stationary I(1) processes and had 
to be differenced before applied as UCR, UIR and UMR.  
 
By specifying CR, IR and MR as variables in a VAR framework, and the intercept term 
C, M and M(-1) as the deterministic components, we selected a maximum order of 5 for the 
VAR.8 The AIC, SBC and LR tests were all consistent in selecting a VAR of order 1. Then, 
the residuals for CR, IR and MR were estimated and saved as UCR, UIR and UMR. Table 2 
presents the results of the VAR estimation. For CR, the residuals appear to be normally 
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distributed white noise, and have no serial correlation or heteroskedasticity. The residuals for 
IR show serial correlation, heteroskedasticity and are not normally distributed. Although MR’s 
residuals have no serial correlation or heteroskedasticity, they do not conform to a normal 
distribution. Because the presence of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity does not affect 
the GMM estimation technique, and that the underlying distribution does not necessarily need 
to conform to a normal distribution (Hansen and West, 2002), UCR, UIR and UMR can be 
applied in our GMM framework. However, GMM does require stationarity in variables 
(Enders, 1995) and since our ADF tests confirm that UCR, UIR and UMR are stationary I(0) 
processes, we use them in our GMM estimation.  
 
[Insert table 2 here] 
 
We also tested our VAR(1) model for cointegrating relationships to establish the 
underlying dynamics of the variables. Table 3 reports the results of the Johansen ML test for 
cointegration. The test was conducted with no restrictions imposed on the intercepts and 
trends so as not to lose any valuable information about the cointegration between variables. 
The r values reported were used to determine the number of linearly dependent cointegrating 
vectors.  
 
[Insert table 3 here] 
 
The results of the first two tests based on maximal eigenvalues and trace statistics show 
that there are not cointegrating relationships between CR, IR and MR. However, based on 
model selection criteria, the AIC and HQC report three cointegrating relationships whereas 
SBC indicates no cointegration. Overall, the evidence is generally in favour of no 
cointegration between the factors. Since the CR, IR and MR are not cointegrated, therefore 
UCR, UIR and UMR will also not have causal relationships between them.9
 
In our first pass regressions, we used one period lagged values of the dependent and 
explanatory variables as the vector of instruments, suggested by Cochrane (1999). A time 
series HAC weighting matrix was selected, so that the estimated parameters would be robust 
to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of an unknown form. Specifically, the Bartlett kernel 
and appropriate bandwidth for the kernel proposed by Newey and West (1987)  was applied 
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and this determines the functional form of the kernel used to weight the autocovariances in the 
computation of the weighting matrix. 
 
A summary of the number of statistically significant beta estimates derived from the 
sample t-statistics, as well as the proportion in relevance to their sample size is shown in table 
4. We found that HCFD has the highest proportion of statistical significance towards UCR 
compared to its less capitalised counterpart PCFD (and PCFD2). This implies that HCFD 
banks keep higher levels of capital due to its greater sensitivity to credit risk. All the groups 
exhibit similar proportions of sensitivities to interest rate risk, with HCFD being most 
susceptible. PCFD banks are most sensitive to market risk, most likely due to their 
diversification activities being subject to market movements while they do not keep adequate 
capital levels to bolster against possible losses. HCNFD and PCNFD are very sensitive 
towards unanticipated market risk UM, most likely because their heavy reliance on traditional 
forms of banking activities as a source of income. If these banks focus on merely making 
loans and taking deposits, sudden upswings in the stock markets may result in less deposits 
and loans as the equity market become more attractive. Subsequently, sudden downswings in 
the stock markets may induce higher saving levels (and more interest to be paid out) and 
higher default rate on loans. This issue applies to bank in all risk groups but may affect less 
diversified banks to a greater extent than diversified ones. 
 
[Insert table 4 here] 
 
Table 5 reports the average estimated betas for each factor both for equally and value 
weighted portfolios in each risk profile group, and a general ranking of the sensitivities of 
each group against the unexpected factors. The average returns for both equally and value 
weighted portfolios indicate that highly capitalised banks perform better than their poorly 
capitalised counterparts. Also, diversified banks had lower standard deviation of returns 
compared to their specialised counterparts in the case of value weighted portfolios.  
 
[Insert table 5 here] 
 
Based on our main hypotheses, the ranking provide mixed results, with inconsistencies 
in the findings for equally weighted portfolios. However, the rankings for value weighted 
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portfolios are uniform across all variables, providing evidence in support of the argument that 
larger banks are those that matter when the stability of financial markets are concerned. 
 
We found that the weakest risk profile is the PCNFD group. Due to poor capital levels, 
these banks are particularly susceptible to sudden changes in market, credit, interest rate and 
maturity risks. Additionally, without adequate diversification, these banks are unable to 
engage in other activities to reduce the heavy reliance on interest income.  
 
HCFD banks also exhibited surprisingly poor insulation against unexpected shocks, 
although our hypotheses expected this group to be the strongest. A possible explanation of 
this is that high capitalisation has nothing to do with strengthening the banks, but instead 
reflect the deterioration of creditworthiness of their borrowers. Another plausible conclusion 
relates to the fact that East Asian banks tend to have more concentrated ownership patterns, 
thus making the banks very risky. Sach et al., 1996 have already noted that the 
implementation of capital standards have not been particularly encouraging for emerging 
markets. Our results for HCFD banks support Rojas-Suarez’s (2001) findings that capitals 
standards for emerging markets do not possess useful supervisory powers compared to 
developed economies. This is due to the diverse structures of their financial sectors, different 
accounting standards and most importantly, lack of standardisation in the classification of 
capital to be included in capital adequacy ratios. 
 
The PCFD banks were better insulated against the risk factors. However, the importance 
of high capital levels should not be quickly dismissed, as our rankings reveal that HCNFD 
banks were on average, the least sensitive against the unanticipated risk factors. 
 
We then applied the JT test for over-identifying restrictions on the estimated model to 
see how well our model “fitted” the data. The test statistic conforms to a chi-squared 
distribution with the degrees of freedom equal to the number of over-identifying restrictions, 
L – K. There were nine instruments and five parameters estimated, and therefore we used four 
over-identifying restrictions. Table 6 summarises the number of banks in each risk profile 
group that rejected the null hypothesis. In our estimation of HCFD banks, only 6 out of 56 
banks rejected the null hypothesis. Similarly, only 6 out of 98 PCFD banks, and 4 out of 27 
PCFD2 banks indicated poor model fit. Overall, our results indicate that the GMM estimation 
of our four-factor model has been efficient and reliable. 
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[Insert table 6 here] 
 
We then used the factor betas derived from the first-pass regressions of (1) as the 
explanatory variables in the cross-sectional regressions of (3). Table 7 reports the results of 
our second-pass regressions. 
 
[Insert table 7 here] 
 
For UM, the equally and value weighted βUM for HCFD banks is positive and the risk 
premium λUM is also positive. This implies that HCFD banks do not wish to hedge against 
unanticipated market risk. Our findings also indicate the same for HCNFD banks. However, 
for equally weighted PCFD and PCNFD banks, the average βUM was positive and λUM was 
found to be negative. Therefore this leads to a conclusion in support of Chen et al. (1986) that 
poorly capitalised banks seek to hedge against UM. 
 
Upon examination of UCR, the βCR for equally and value weighted portfolios of HCFD 
banks are both negative. The value weighted portfolio estimate for λCR is negative, consistent 
with our hypothesis. The results for HCNFD banks are mixed however, where the equally 
weighted beta and risk premium estimates are both negative, implying that HCNFD banks do 
not wish to hedge against unanticipated credit risk. However, in the results of HCNFD banks 
in the value weighted case indicate a propensity to hedge. In both PCFD2’s portfolios, both 
the beta and risk premium estimates are negative, leading to our conclusion that these banks 
do not wish to hedge against credit risk. PCNFD banks have a positive beta and risk premium 
of the opposite sign in an equally weighted case implying that they do wish to hedge against 
credit risk but the results from a value weighted case indicate otherwise. 
 
The results for HCFD banks are consistent with our hypotheses regarding the UIR. The 
beta estimates for both equally and value weighted portfolios are negative and the associated 
risk premiums, positive. The same desire to hedge was found for HCNFD and PCNFD but not 
for PCFD and PCFD2. Overall, highly capitalised banks and very weak banks exhibit the 
wish to hedge against UIR but as long as a bank is functionally diversified, even if it is poorly 
capitalised, it is not concerned with interest rate risk factors. 
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Finally, HCFD and HCNFD banks do not appear to hedge against UMR, whereas PCFD 
and PCNFD banks do. Perhaps, the highly capitalised banks hold higher levels of capital to 
hedge against the possible future default of their borrowers while their poorly capitalised 
counterparts look for other means to control for such events occurring. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Overall, our results indicate that the highly capitalised banks in our sample yield higher 
stock returns but may be in fact more risky because the high levels of capital they hold reflect 
their perceptions of riskiness in their lending portfolios. Although the capital adequacy ratios 
were introduced to strengthen banks from the risks inherent to financial intermediation, it 
appears that these banks holding more capital are merely compensating for undertaking riskier 
loans instead of aiming to strengthen their balance sheets. In comparison, diversified banks’ 
returns were less volatile, echoing the benefits that diversification brings to the stabilisation of 
income for these banks. Our results also indicate that constructing value weighted portfolios 
will yield more consistent and meaningful estimates than equally weighted portfolios. 
 
There were three main lessons to be drawn from our results. If banks are not going to be 
functionally diversified and rely on the traditional forms of banking, they must hold higher 
levels of capital to ensure their safety and soundness. However, in the case of functionally 
diversified banks, there would not be any use of the banks reporting high capital levels, when 
they may be in fact increasing their risk-taking behaviour by making out even riskier loans, in 
an effort to replenish equity capital. As long as the banks are functionally diversified, and 
provided that the composition of their lending portfolios are not changing for the worse, their 
efforts to diversify away risks using other non-interest income earning activities should pay 
off and ensure the strength of the banks against deteriorating macroeconomic conditions. 
Finally, poorly capitalised banks that are not engaged in adequate diversification activities 
should try to adopt at least one characteristic of the other groups. Fortunately, the sample 
indicates that there are only three of such banks and so this form of weakness in the banking 
system is not prevalent in East Asia. 
 
Additionally, our results established that poorly capitalised banks do not seek to hedge 
against market and credit risks. However, highly capitalised banks appear to seek hedging 
against credit and interest rate risks. These findings suggest that the banks hold high levels of 
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capital in an active effort to protect themselves against unanticipated risk factors. High capital 
levels also seem to be an effective means for protecting against possible future losses on loan 
portfolios, measured by the maturity risk factor. 
 
The empirical evidence supports our hypotheses. With the importance of stable banking 
systems in ensuring strong financial and economic systems, the capital adequacy guidelines 
proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision have the potential to strengthen 
banks in the Asia-Pacific region, provided that consistent classifications are established in 
these countries. As banks are becoming increasingly universal, the benefits of corporate 
diversification have shown encouraging results. Thus, the role of prudential regulation and 
market disciplinary forces will continue to be crucial for banks. 
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Notes 
 
 
1. Landschoot and Vander Vennet (2001) conducted a similar study with a sample of 
banks from Europe, Norway, Switzerland, U.S., Canada and Australia. Their study 
accounted primarily on credit risk, but also examined the effects of bank risk profiles on 
market and maturity risks. All banks in their sample conformed to the BIS capital 
adequacy standard of 8%.  
 
2. Additional evidence showing that banks do reduce lending to riskier companies in an 
effort to control capital levels on their balance sheets have also been presented by Dahl 
and Shrieves (1990), Peek and Rosengren (1997) and Jacques and Nigro (1997). 
 
3. Sironi (2002) also warns that with recent developments in capital regulation, the role of 
prudential supervision would be outdated and the role of market forces in controlling 
banks’ risk taking behaviour must be increased. Crockett (2002) notes that in order for 
market disciplinary forces to be effective, the market must possess sufficient 
information, sufficient processing ability for that information, the right incentives to act 
on them and the proper channels to exercise discipline. 
 
4.  CAMEL indicators are capital adequacy, asset quality, management quality, earnings 
and liquidity. 
 
5.  Campbell, Lo and Mackinlay (1997, p. 226) also present an excellent interpretation of 
the APT model that allows for multiple risk factors in approximating expected returns.  
 
6.  All relevant data was obtained from Datastream.  
 
7.  With the introduction of the new risk profile group PCFD2, the sample size of the group 
decreases to 27 banks and therefore the total sample reduces to 91 banks.  
 
8.  Orders of 6 to 10 were also tested and all revealed the same results as an order of 5. 
 
9.  Granger causality tests were conducted on UCR, UIR and UMR and so causal 
relationships were found between the variables for lags up to 5 time periods.  
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Table 1:  Number of banks in each risk profile group
  Non-Interest Income
Total Income 
  FD > 15% NFD < 15% 
HC > 6% 56 5 Total Equity
Total Assets PC < 6% 98 3 
Notes: This table shows the breakdown of the 162 banks used in this study into the various risk profile groups. 
Highly capitalised (HC) banks are those with an equity-to-assets ratio of over 6%, and Functionally Diversified 
(FD) banks are those with a ratio of non-interest income to total income of more than 15%. These thresholds are 
applied by Fitch/IBCA Bankscope in assessment of banks and producing their credit ratings. 
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Table 2:  VAR estimation results for CR, IR and MR
 VAR estimation results for 
CR 
   
 CR(-1) IR(-1) MR(-1) M M(-1) 
Coef 0.96012 0.01052 -0.01302 0.00030 -0.00303 
T-ratio 39.69700 2.43990 -1.45270 0.19279 -1.95460 
 [.000] [.016] [.149] [.847] [.053] 
      
 Serial Correlation Functional Form Normality  Heteroscedasticity  
 15.14110 0.02156 2.27520 0.00159  
 [.234] [.883] [.321] [.968]  
      
 VAR estimation results for 
IR 
   
 CR(-1) IR(-1) MR(-1) M M(-1) 
Coef. -0.20023 0.98933 0.10217 -0.00743 0.00651 
T-Ratio -2.35550 65.31780 3.24470 -1.37170 1.19660 
 [.020] [.000] [.002] [.173] [.234] 
      
 Serial Correlation Functional Form Normality  Heteroscedasticity  
 24.56830 6.64080 187.38090 7.05490  
 [.017] [.010] [.000] [.008]  
      
 VAR estimation results for 
MR 
   
 CR(-1) IR(-1) MR(-1) M M(-1) 
Coef. 0.23216 -0.01534 0.93918 0.00536 0.00096 
T-ratio 2.89520 -1.07360 31.61710 1.04960 0.18788 
 [.005] [.285] [.000] [.296] [.851] 
      
 Serial Correlation Functional Form Normality  Heteroscedasticity  
 7.70080 0.34071 23.17310 0.88508  
 [.808] [.559] [.000] [.347]  
      
Notes:  The T-ratios for each coefficient is the ratio of the coefficient and its standard error. The probability 
values of the T-ratios are reported in parenthesis underneath. Generally, a T-ratio greater than 2, or a probability 
value of less than 0.05 indicates that the corresponding coefficient is statistically significant in determining the 
dependent variable at a 95% level of significanceIn the diagnostic tests on the residuals, the test for serial 
correlation is the Lagrange multiplier test. The test for functional form is the Ramsey's RESET test using the 
square of the fitted values. The test for normality is based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals (JB) 
and the test for heteroskedasticity is based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values (White 
Test). All the diagnostic tests statistics reported are distributed as χ2 under the null and compared against a p-
value, reported in the paranthesis, of 0.05. When the reported p-value is less than 0.05, then the null hypothesis 
of no serial correlation, accurate functional form, normality and homoskedasticity are rejected. All statistically 
significant probability values are in bold. 
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Table 3:  Results of Johansen ML test for cointegrating relationships 
 
Cointegration LR Test Based on Maximal Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
Order of VAR = 1. 
 List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: CR   IR   MR 
 List of I(0) variables included in the VAR:   M            M(-1) 
 List of eigenvalues in descending order:  .15912     .092643     .034015 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Null      Alternative     Statistic      95% Critical Value      90% Critical Value 
 r = 0       r = 1         20.4505            24.3500                 22.2600 
 r<= 1      r = 2         11.4719            18.3300                 16.2800 
 r<= 2      r = 3          4.0836            11.5400                  9.7500 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Cointegration LR Test Based on Trace of the Stochastic Matrix 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
Null     Alternative     Statistic      95% Critical Value      90% Critical Value 
 r = 0       r>= 1         36.0061            39.3300                 36.2800 
 r<= 1       r>= 2         15.5555            23.8300                 21.2300 
 r<= 2       r = 3          4.0836            11.5400                  9.7500 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Choice of the Number of Cointegrating Relations Using Model Selection Criteria 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
Rank       Maximized LL   AIC              SBC              HQC 
 r = 0          1721.6           1709.6           1693.0           1702.9 
 r = 1          1731.8           1714.8           1691.3           1705.3 
 r = 2          1737.6           1717.6           1689.9           1706.3 
 r = 3          1739.6           1718.6           1689.5           1706.8 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: When the statistic is less than the critical value, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected in favour of the 
alternative. The r is used to determine the number of cointegrating vectors. Figures in bold show the test results 
based on each of the three tests. 
 
Table 4:  Number of statistically significant beta estimates
 HCFD HCNFD PCFD PCFD2 PCNFD 
No. of  banks 56 5 98 27 3 
Intercept 18 
(32.14%) 
0 19 
(19.39%) 
8 
(29.63%) 
0 
UM 38 
(67.86%) 
3 
(100%) 
73 
(74.49%) 
18 
(66.67%) 
3 
(100%) 
UCR 25 
(44.64%) 
0 12 
(12.25%) 
1 
(3.7%) 
0 
UIR 23 
(41.07%) 
0 22 
(22.45%) 
9 
(33.3%) 
1 
(33.3%) 
UMR 11 
(19.64%) 
0 23 
(23.47%) 
12 
(44.4%) 
0 
Notes: The number of statistically significant beta estimates were determined by counting the number of 
corresponding t-statistics greater than 2 in absolute value. The proportions are reported in the brackets, and are 
simply the ratio between the number of significant estimates with the number of banks in each sample/ risk 
group. 
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Table 5:  Estimated betas derived from first-pass GMM regression
 Equally-weighted portfolios     
 HCFD HCNFD PCFD PCFD2 PCNFD 
CONST -0.00153 -0.01817 -0.00550 -0.00574 -0.04718 
UM 0.46614 2.09705 0.38853 -0.55144 0.04284 
UCR -14.95657 -0.06539 0.21895 -3.13482 9.31720 
UIR -8.02658 -0.49682 -0.11761 -4.25474 -11.56019 
UMR -0.93142 -0.42510 -0.69214 1.28406 6.19220 
      
Ave returns -0.00039 -0.01194 -0.00699 -0.00767 -0.02591 
Std Dev 0.01168 0.00635 0.00812 0.01317 0.03283 
      
Value-weighted portfolios     
 HCFD HCNFD PCFD PCFD2 PCNFD 
CONST 0.00008 0.00001 -0.00007 -0.00003 0.00199 
UM 0.01028 -0.00121 0.00575 0.01977 0.21859 
UCR -0.28678 0.00047 -0.04979 -0.05169 -3.05287 
UIR -0.14595 0.00351 -0.00421 -0.02501 -2.47701 
UMR -0.08430 0.00681 -0.03058 -0.15535 -0.41406 
      
Ave returns 0.00015 -0.00170 -0.00007 -0.00001 -0.00851 
Std Dev 0.00073 0.00230 0.00028 0.00014 0.00638 
 
Ranking based on equally-weighted portfolios   
 UM UCR UIR UMR  
More sensitive HCNFD HCFD PCNFD HCFD  
 HCFD PCFD2 HCFD PCFD  
 PCFD HCNFD HCNFD HCNFD  
Least sensitive PCNFD PCNFD PCFD PCNFD  
      
Ranking based on value-weighted portfolios   
 UM UCR UIR UMR  
More sensitive PCNFD PCNFD PCNFD PCNFD  
 HCFD HCFD HCFD HCFD   
 PCFD PCFD2 PCFD PCFD  
Least sensitive HCNFD HCNFD HCNFD HCNFD  
      
      
Notes: The first pass regressions were estimated according to equation [1] where: Rit = α + βMUMt + βCRUCRt + 
βIRUIRt + βMRUMRt +εit. The unanticipated components of the factors have been estimated in the previous 
section and tested for cointegration. The ranking criteria is as follows: stronger banks should be less sensitive to 
the unanticipated components with relatively smaller betas for UM, less negative values in the case of UCR, UIR 
and UMR. 
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Table 6:  Number of banks rejecting the null hypothesis of satisfactory model specification
Risk Profile Group 
 
No. of JT > critical value 
2χ
HCFD 
HCNFD 
PCFD / PCFD2 
PCNFD 
6 
0 
6/ 4 
0 
Note: JT = J-statistic × No. of observations. The critical value at 4 degrees of freedom, given a 95% 
significance level is 9.488. If J
2χ
T > 9.488, the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are satisfied is 
rejected. 
 
 
 
Table 7:  Estimated risk premiums from the second-pass regressions
      
 Equally-weighted portfolios     
 HCFD HCNFD PCFD PCFD2 PCNFD 
λ0 -0.00408 -0.20078 -0.00202 -0.00072 0.02053 
λM 0.011907 0.01209 -0.012486 -0.014418 -0.00551 
λCR 0.00006 -0.00002 -0.000211 -0.00032 -0.00241 
λIR 0.00014 0.00009 -0.00001 0.00005 0.00414 
λMR -0.00013 0.00011 0.00011 0.00017 0.00389 
      
Value-weighted portfolios     
 HCFD HCNFD PCFD PCFD2 PCNFD 
λ0 -0.00002 0.00011 -0.00001 -0.006574 -0.01120 
λM 0.010970 1.51016 -0.010631 -0.329732 0.02489 
λCR -0.00017 -0.04216 -0.00006 -0.00030 -0.00113 
λIR .00061 -0.02497 -0.00162 -0.028012 0.00070 
λMR -0.001217 0.01775 0.00452 0.01028 0.01080 
      
 
Notes: The risk premiums were estimated according to the second-pass regression specified in (3):  
µRi = λ0 + βiM λM + βiCR λCR +βiIR λIR +βiMR λMR where µ is the expected equally weighted and value weighted 
return for each portfolio group. The statistically significant estimates are in bold, evaluated using t-ratios greater 
than 2 in absolute value. T-ratios for HCNFD and PCNFD could not be derived due to the small number of 
banks in the samples. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
